Twenty-five years after ‘Operation Vijay,’ the lack of coordination among security agencies and the delayed response to the Pakistani Army’s intrusion in Kargil remain critical points of discussion. Air Vice Marshal Narayan Menon (Retired), who was the Air Officer Commanding for Jammu & Kashmir and the first from the Indian Air Force involved in ‘Operation Safed Sagar,’ highlighted that if there had been better communication and diligence among intelligence and operational agencies, the Kargil war might have been prevented. Menon, a decorated veteran of the 1965 and 1971 wars, emphasized the initial lack of coordination between the Army and Air Force, which hampered operational planning during the Kargil conflict.
Recalling the events between May and July 1999, Menon noted that the Pakistani intrusion was first detected on May 8, 1999, but the Indian Air Force (IAF) only received orders to launch an offensive on May 25, with attacks commencing the following day. The air operations were concluded by July 12, and a ceasefire was declared on July 26. Most of the offensive air operations were conducted from Srinagar, Avantipore, Adampur, and Ambala, with the IAF engaging targets at unprecedented altitudes of around 20,000 feet. Despite the IAF’s efforts in softening enemy targets, Menon stressed that the Indian Army’s ground forces were essential for reclaiming the occupied posts.
One significant lesson from the Kargil war was the innovative use of technology. During a brainstorming session, a young flight lieutenant suggested using GPS for high-level bombing. Handheld GPS devices were installed in fighter aircraft and helicopters, enabling them to conduct precise bomb releases from altitudes of 9 km, out of missile range. This novel approach was successfully trialed on May 29, and the first high-altitude release missions were executed the next day, showcasing the importance of technological adaptation in modern warfare.
Post Your Comments